PREFACE
How might the space domain be escalated along the continuum of conflict, and is that escalation similar in nature to air, land, and sea domains? This is a generalized question asked by United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to Air University (AU) in order to build a greater temporal understanding of the escalatory properties of space capabilities as they mature from concept to reality. The year-long space elective at Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) has given me a rare opportunity to delve into the mystery, mystique, and operational capabilities of this unique domain. Awakened with a greater understanding and mastery of the science behind the medium, I felt empowered and adequately prepared to research USSTRATCOM's question, and through retrospect, displace supposition with primary facts to build plausibility of escalating space capabilities, operations along a continuum of any given conflict. My "space empowerment" was not entirely of my own making, but was spawned and nurtured by my research advisor.
I would like to thank my classmates for their insight, depth, and breadth of space knowledge, which furthered my own base of space domain awareness. I also would like to thank our stellar instructors for their endurance in instructing me and empowerment to let me select a research topic which challenged me to think strategic about space and its enduring application within all other domains. Finally, I thank my family for their belief in me and the strength they gave me to finish this paper.
Introduction

"One small ball in the air [Sputnik I]. I wouldn't believe that at this moment you have to fear the intelligence aspects of this."
-President Eisenhower, 9 October 1957 How might the space domain be escalated along the continuum of conflict, and is that escalation similar in nature to air, land, and sea domains? This question, proposed by USSTRATCOM, marks the foundation of this research paper, which sets upon the task to divulge the escalatory capabilities of space, and space assets, as it pertains to the range of military operations and phases: It seeks to answer the "how" space-based assets may be escalated along a conflict continuum. By way of theoretical analysis, a pragmatic approach will arise, which shows the applicability and plausibility of escalating space requirements, along the military escalation continuum of operations, without the presence or need to weaponize the domain. A common approach or language is required when seeking to develop an altruistic perspective on a complex and "deep of mind" aspect of space. This work endeavors to develop such language, thereby exhuming clarity of foresight to a single aspect of space, escalation, while balancing it against its physical and theoretical properties.
Escalation represents a set of pseudo prescribed acts, counter-act properties which evolve over the time-span of any given conflict or military operation and culminate in a grand final battle or total war. 1 The escalatory principles of both land and sea power grew from a
preponderance of time where conflict tested act, counter-act capabilities could be understood by both sides of a conflict; hence, building a common language of escalation within the two domains. Airpower, on the other hand, flashed upon the battlespace. Escalation of its capabilities were forged in battle and only refined during the inter-war years --timeframe between conflicts. Oddly, spacepower has matured along a timeline similar to land and seaslow, methodical, and often retrospective. However, the capabilities which space brings to a given conflict represent a trajectory similar to airpower, fast, multidimensional, and exponential in effects; hence, an understanding of spacepower, and those capabilities which represent it, becomes relevant and predictably necessary to dissuade these two diametrically opposed approaches to its future development and escalation.
John Sheldon and Colin Gray, with great ease and simplicity, state a fundamental element of space which helps ground its escalatory property to those of air, land and sea: "Space is a place." 2 If space is a 'place' similar in relative use and punctuality to other domains, then it is suffice to say it, too, can be escalated much the same way as air, land, and sea. In order to escalate space, it becomes paramount to understand the elements of space and how spacepower is derived from them. Spacepower is thought to be an intangible element of the space domain much the same way gravity is --one can sense its effects, but cannot touch those elements which make the effects. However, United States (U.S.) military space policy has clearly defined four unique space missions that are tangible and provide the foundation for understanding how space can escalate over the spectrum of conflict: force enhancement, support, control, and application. 3 Separately, each mission area provides only a marginal element of capabilities for a conflict; however, together, they represent a profound function of space known as "spacepower,"
which can then be holistically escalated along a diverse continuum of conflict engagements.
Spacepower, as a function of its entirety, brings forth synergistic capabilities which augment air, land, and sea operations. It not only escalates along the continuum of conflict, but along the continuum of U.S. instruments of power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic. Space is a hostile, rigid domain, constrained more so by the laws of physics than air, land and sea; yet, its inalienable freedom of movement, over watch, and persistency subdue its rigidity and give it a measure of military operational flexibility which avers its rightful place alongside other domains and their ability to escalate to meet mission requirements. Space's ability to be escalated along the continuum of conflict and military operations is not solely based on the weaponization, or non-weaponization, of space; instead, it is based on the kinetic, coercive potential of space as a whole, as its parts fit within and augment other domains. This research paper will transform the entirety of spacepower into tangible multi-spectral set of capabilities which can be supplanted upon and escalated within any given conflict continuum.
The escalatory capabilities of space which military strategists must know and understand are not only based on the physical attributes of space, e.g. the satellite, but on the dynamic qualitative benefits of the entire space domain: a global, ubiquitous presence.
Scope and Limitations of this Research
The main focus of this research paper is on what escalatory properties the space domain has when supplanted upon a conflict continuum replete with military application: From Phase 0, shaping the environment, to Phase 4, stabilization efforts. 4 By having the scope of this paper reside firmly in the realm of military operations, it inherently limits the research to just those areas of space application and power which support military-centric operations during a conflict.
According to a 2013 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) report, the commercial segment of space is inherently pushing past that of the military, 5 instrument of national power; however, the lack of a real spacepower theory, and the known weaponization of space itself, limits a Clausewitzian-minded military from seeing the escalatory capabilities of space during a conflict.
Lastly, this research paper is theoretical in nature and based on a domain which lacks depth of usage when compared to air, land, and sea domains. Early airpower pundits, such as General William "Billy" Mitchell, 6 were not only afforded the time to develop their airpower theory, but were also afforded the ability to put in practice those theories simultaneously as they were being developed. This is not the case for space due to the ever increasing cost of getting there and the dynamic hostility of its environment. Not every nation can get to space, which limits use and subsequent experience of the domain during conflict. Additionally, nations who utilize the space domain do so without the advantage of testing their theories, doctrine, or escalatory properties prior to sending a fully funded, and costly, satellite into space. This limits the quantitative "knowledge" of the domain along with how it can be escalated along the continuum of conflict.
Organization of Research
The research contained within this study follows a sequential path starting with a fundamental definition and relative scope of escalation based on theoretical and military doctrinal context of the subject. From a foundation and common understanding of escalation, the study provides a current, rudimentary theory of spacepower to include its plausible coercion aspects and strategic effects based operations which set it part-in-parcel to other domains. Space weaponization, a subject which should not be discounted, runs parallel to spacepower, making it a subject of brief discussion in order to pose the "what if" plausibility of escalating spacepower in similar fashion as air, land, and sea domains. Issues and options for space escalation round out the report and establish a jumping off point for future research into both spacepower and its escalation along the continuum of conflict. it during conflicts; however, the debate continues on the appropriateness to weaponize it in order to continue its dominance within it. To add balance and perspective to the research, this paper reviews the militarization of space and theoretical aspects of weaponizing it, either offensively or defensively, along with the challenges of doing so from a policy perspective. Additionally, if the path of space escalation is through the continued militarization and possible weaponization of it, then options are needed which operate within the current framework of space treaties; yet, do not limit the amount, timing, or escalation capabilities of it.
Chapter 5: Conclusion. Launching from a foundational understanding of escalation, spacepower, militarization and weaponization, and options for space escalation, this paper proposes an iterative conclusion on the "how" and/or feasibility of escalating space along the continuum of conflict in comparison to the air, land, and sea domain. The weighted value of space during any conflict is large, but its coercive value is not fully known or been measured.
This gap in analysis leaves a misunderstanding of how to escalate space during a conflict in a similar way as with other domains; however, space's ability to be escalated, along the continuum of conflict and military operations, is not solely based on its singularity of use; instead, it is based on the coercive potential of space as a whole, as its parts fit within and augment other domains.
This brief research into the escalation of the space domain, from both a civilian and military vantage point, is not meant to be an in-depth, all inclusive perspective on the topic.
Instead, it is a brief interlude on the surface of escalation where the theory of escalation can form and provide context as the research moves towards spacepower -what is meant by spacepower and how might its elements be made available for escalation.
Chapter 2 Escalation 101
"We sleep safely at night because rough men stand ready to visit violence on those who would harm us." -Winston S. Churchill
Renowned geostrategist Herman Kahn (1922 Kahn ( -1983 provided an eloquent, yet simple definition of escalation, in a broad, un-complex context, as being "a 'competition in risk-taking' or at least resolve, and a matching of local resources, in some form of limited conflict between two sides." 7 This rise in conflict, between two sides, leads to a rise in the use of military assets and/or capabilities from which one side seeks to overpower and dominate the other; to force the other side to forego its will to fight. Not only can a nation escalate during a conflict, but it can do so prior to the start of a conflict.
Again, Herman Kahn gives another meaning to escalation which goes beyond the basics of force-on-force application of the military instrument of power:
"A nation may also escalate for prudential as well as coercive reasons: to prevent something worse from happening, to meet a problem, to prepare for likely escalations on the other side, and so on." three broad ways a nation may escalate during limited conflicts. In each case, nations seek to overwhelm or overpower the other side with a preponderance of force; whether it is diplomatic, information, military, and/or economic. 9 By moving outward from the center, where the conflict is relatively stable and both sides are seen to be equal, nations escalate by increasing their level of conflict intensity; who their intended target needs to be; and finally, the area of intended operations. Escalation of each element, along this continuum, may occur in series or in parallel depending on the desire and force generation capabilities of the escalating nation.
The bottom line of this research is simply: Nations do not need to escalate just their military IOP nor do they need to coerce with force to bring an adversary to a culmination point where they forego further hostilities. This reduction in the need to apply direct force application during escalation opens the door for spacepower to be applied and escalated along what the military views as the conflict continuum. provides a wider aperture of operational characteristics which do not focus solely on the kinetic application of spacepower, due to its limited kinetic force, but on non-kinetic spacepower that is derived from the domains ubiquitous nature: spacepower is everywhere and involved in all other kinetic, non-kinetic applications generated from the other four domains. In order to conceptualize how space might be escalated along the conflict continuum a generalized understanding of spacepower is necessary.
Chapter 3 Generalized Spacepower Theory
"Space is a warfighting medium on equal footing with air, land, and sea."
The Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik in 1957 became the basis for space power theory, and international debate immediately emerged on potential applications of an enemy satellite orbiting the earth. Theories ranged from dropping nuclear weapons from space to peacefully overflying countries for treaty verification. 12 Operations Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom gave military theorists a glimpse into the application of space power; however, the validity of their theories has yet to be extensively tested. Theorists continue to search for strategies to interpret and employ space power.
Connecting Space History to Space Power Theory
The development of space power theory is one that has both a rich past and an ever growing future. In Chapter 1, a brief look at space history is given in order to provide a grounding foundation of historical space events from which space power theory can, and does, build from. To connect space history to space power theory, the following time-line of events is given which show how, and more importantly why, the U.S. sought the need to develop a coherent space power theory (it gives the "so what" behind historical space events): in the use of space for national security. 13 Each of these salient points highlights the interconnectedness of space power application and the domain of warfare. 14 They represent a crescendo of historical points where space emerged from "behind the scenes" to become an integral facet of air, land, and sea power.
Finally, they lay the foundational elements for deriving a strategic spacepower theory.
A Construct of Strategic Spacepower
Lieutenant Commander John Klein, 15 U.S. Navy, proposes to define a theory of space power and operations, which at a granular level is dissimilar from sea power, but at the strategic and theoretical levels share many commonalities and provide a bridge which commanders may use to link space assets to military operations (listed below) in order to escalate space:
"National Power Implications. Space operations and activities utilizing space-based assets have broad implications for national power in peace and war, implications that include diplomatic, military, economic, technological, and information elements.
Furthermore, military operations in space are extensively interrelated with national and political interests, and any action in space, even minor ones, can impact the balance of wealth and power among nations.
Interdependence with Other Operations. Operations in space are interdependent with those on land, at sea, and in the air. Space warfare is just a subset of wartime strategy and operations; accordingly, space forces must operate in concert with other military forces.
Moreover, space strategy should work within the overall national strategy, since it is next to impossible for space operations alone to decide a war's outcome.
Command of Space.
Command of space is the control of space communications 16 for civil, commercial, intelligence, and military purposes. The inherent value of space is as a means of communications; therefore, space warfare must work directly or indirectly toward either securing command of space or preventing the enemy from securing it. Command of space does not mean that one's adversary cannot act, only that he cannot seriously interfere in one's actions. Additionally, the command of space will normally be in dispute. Coercion, states noted military historian Robert Pape, occurs when a nation uses its instruments of national power to change the forthcoming behavior of an adversary. 21 There are two distinct types of coercion: punishment and denial. Coercion via punishment boils down to inflicting great suffering and pain primarily on an adversary's civilian population, but may also include his standing military forces. 22 This is not the desired nor the applicable form of coercion space seeks to inflict upon an adversary, nor is it a true escalation model because it inflicts the maximum amount of risk upon a nation, which precludes any form of escalation. However, coercion by denial offers a more viable option for space, using Klein's spacepower dictums above, as it allows for greater latitude of space application and escalation.
Coercion via denial utilizes military ends, ways, and means to "prevent the target 
Space and Full Spectrum Dominance
Joint Vision 2020 labels full spectrum dominance as the ability of U.S. forces "to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains -space, sea, land, air, and information." 26 Space bridges the gap between desired effects and actual effects within any given domain. It synergizes domains within the military instrument of power and augments their ability to project power from, thru, and into a desired theater and across the full range of operations.
Space is also tied into our National Security Strategy via the 2010 National Space Policy.
This policy document provides the strategic overarching goal of U.S. space objectives and our means of maintaining our superiority in the domain:
 It is the shared interest of all nations to act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. The United States considers the sustainability, stability, and free access to, and use of, space vital to its national interests. Space operations should be conducted in ways that emphasize openness and transparency to improve public awareness of the activities of government, and enable others to share in the benefits provided by the use of space.
 A robust and competitive commercial space sector is vital to continued progress in space. The United States is committed to encouraging and facilitating the growth of a U.S. commercial space sector that supports U.S. needs, is globally competitive, and advances U.S. leadership in the generation of new markets and innovation-driven entrepreneurship.
 All nations have the right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity, in accordance with international law. Consistent with this principle, "peaceful purposes" allows for space to be used for national and homeland security activities.
 As established in international law, there shall be no national claims of sovereignty over outer space or any celestial bodies. The United States considers the space systems of all nations to have the rights of passage through, and conduct of operations in, space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems, including supporting infrastructure, will be considered an infringement of a nation's rights.
 The United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them. 27 Space enables full spectrum dominance across the breadth of military operations and conflict continuum so that the U.S. can maintain its global security and achieve its national objectives.
Example of Spacepower Escalation
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990-1991, represented the first time the U.S. actively, purposefully used military satellites during a full-scale conflict. Airpower historian Ben
Lambeth writes, in "Unseen War," how prior to, and during Desert Shield, U.S. escalated its strategic assets, to include space-based capabilities --satellites and personnel manning support for those satellites, to defeat and "takedown" Saddam's regime. 28 The data for this escalation resides in the Gulf War Air Power Survey: Volumes 4 and 5.
As tensions escalated between coalition, U.S., and Iraqi governments over Iraq's invasion of the sovereign Gulf nation of Kuwait, so too did each nations' military capabilities. Volumes 4 and 5 of the Gulf War Air Power Survey show that along with air, sea, and land, space, too, was escalated to meet the needs of the growing conflict. 29 Due to the level of classification, a true understanding and measurement of how space was escalated during Desert Shield and Storm is unobtainable; however, Volume 5 does highlight the significant amount of communication, surveillance, guidance (GPS), and weather satellite capabilities which were incrementally applied (escalated) to meet the needs of the other domains as they, too, escalated. 30 This example from Gulf War One shows how Klein's dictums fit within the realm of plausibility on how to escalate spacepower and how, by way of Pape, such subtle, yet coercive activities can, and did, hinder an adversary's (Iraq's) ability to move and maneuver --raising its level of risk to continue hostilities.
What this quick vignette of Gulf War One shows is the plausibility and potential "how to" in escalating spacepower along the continuum of conflict. This escalation was done without the need to fully and/or directly weaponize space; however, weaponizing space is the possible "next step" for the space domain, which would increase its ability to overtly escalate.
Chapter 4 Militarization and Weaponization of Space
"However, few would argue that warfare will eventually come to the space domain. Where mankind endeavors, conflict has always followed." 
Militarization of Space
The militarization of space, as shown in the previous chapter, is nothing new to the US. 43 was a dynamic demonstration of its ability to master the technical aspects of shooting down something in space, from earth; however, the second order effect, which was un-intended, was the extraordinary release of debris, which, according to Ann Robertson, is the "largest release of debris to date." 44 Robertson states a third order effect from China's ASAT test, was the need for the US to "hastily" move its $1.3 billion Terra satellite out of the way of the newly formed China ASAT debris field. 45 The research in this chapter shows that although the militarization of space is growing, and will continue to grow, the weaponization of space might not be a viable escalation option for the space domain due second and third order negative effects, which affect all space-based assets -friend and foe alike. Weaponization of space, although not fully outlawed by the Outer Space Treaty, should not be the "sine qua non" of either spacepower or space escalation. Evidence has shown, as in the case of the Chinese ASAT test, where the weaponization of space would cause undesirable second and third order effects which could destabilize or degrade the space domain to a culmination point where it is no longer viable for any nation to operate in; thus, removing its escalatory properties.
Weaponization of Space
Space is hostile in nature; yet, ubiquitous within all other domains. As air, land, and sea escalate along the continuum of military conflict, so, too, can space. Its ability to escalate in a coercive manner, raising the level of operational risk of an adversary, 50 is not relegated to the need for direct kinetic effects; instead, its ability to escalate should be measured on its affect and/or support to other domains: The whole of space is greater than its parts, and escalation of space is plausible within the military conflict continuum.
